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Article
Democracy and cultural
psychology
Steffen Ernø
University of Aalborg, Denmark
Abstract
This paper discusses a theme touched upon in Robert Innis’s article on cultural psych-
ology and philosophy, namely how we, within cultural psychology, seem to be undecided
about how best to provide value on a societal level. It is discussed how psychology has
provided us with several valuable tools for examining and understanding our own exist-
ence, despite the fact that it is also a field that has seemed to be in one crisis after
another since its inception. It is argued that cultural psychology is an intellectual tech-
nology that allows us to peek under the hood of society, which is of utmost importance
in today’s society, where democratic ideals are under severe pressure. Corporations,
industries, and privileged individuals exercise increased control over political processes,
having created obscure systems by which they operate. It is concluded that cultural
psychology needs to find its role as a scientific discipline that contributes to making
transparent the political, social, and interpersonal relations that define how our lives are
shaped, if we want a discipline that provides value beyond the scientific realm.
Keywords
Cultural psychology, democracy, philosophy, science studies, values
How did we get to ‘democracy’?
One of my main takeaways from reading Robert Innis’s paper was that this would
be a nice opportunity to contemplate the position that cultural psychology inhabits
in the scientific realm. Not just the position it already has, but also what we want
cultural psychology to be when peering into the near future. The title for this
commentary is an altered version of John Dewey’s book ‘Democracy and
Education’ (2011). Dewey published this book as an introduction to education
that would not overemphasize the role of either the individual or the society.
Instead, he advocated for his perspective to see the mind as that which emerges
in the communal process between the two (Dewey, 2011, p. 2). Evoking democracy
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is very powerful to me, not in the least because I find the ideals found in democratic
thinking among the most beautiful conjured up by the mind of man. Whenever
philosophy is brought up as a topic I always find myself straying to the questions at
the core of the discipline: what is good and what is just? Surely, as is pointed out by
Innis, philosophy concerns itself with matters that are often taken into abstraction
in order to divine truths or simply to lessen the interference of real world consid-
eration, so that matters may be discussed on a general, and purely academic level.
Concepts like equality and freedom, both of which resonate strongly with democ-
racy, are often linked to debates belonging to the philosophic tradition. In cultural
psychology, however, we should be able to advance this kind of thinking from
abstraction to the practical, since we find ourselves in the intersection between the
two disciplines, exactly as stated by Innis in his very first line of the paper (2016,
p. 331). In cultural psychology, we have, in addition to Dewey, Charles Peirce, Lev
Vygotsky, and Serge Moscovici that we count among the ‘founders’ of the prin-
ciples we follow. From them we have been informed of ways to regard the intimate
relation between our discipline and its ontological basis – the human and its realm,
which is also one of the key points made by Dewey in Democracy and Education.
However, by considering this relation one question is of utmost importance, one
not overseen by Innis, who asks:
Is cultural psychology on its own in a position to determine whether our conduct is
out of control and hence ‘irrational?’ Here we encounter once again the problem of
cultural psychology as a normative science. A human science such as cultural psych-
ology, which engages self-interpreting human beings, clearly has to settle the issue of
whether it intends to, or even would want to, ‘‘leave everything as it is,’’ or whether it
can at least determine what simply cannot be left as it is on both the social and
personal levels, which are clearly inextricably intertwined. (Innis, 2016, p. 340)
Innis here states that we, as researchers in the scientific discipline that is cultural
psychology, remain undecided, maybe even unreflective, about our role in society.
I believe that trying to answer this question is a necessary next step. We are at a
point where Dewey’s lessons about the mutual constituent relationship between the
person, and that which lies beyond the individual has been taken to heart. The fact
that psychology is a normative science, as pointed out by Innis in his paper, but
more extensively by Brinkmann (2011), makes it even more important that ques-
tions of the kind Innis asks, but does not fully answer in his paper, are treated more
urgently. In cultural psychology we have many contributions that advance our
understandings of the complex, and wide-ranging societies we live in, along with
the norms and the history that we form, just as we are formed by them. However,
psychology as a whole, has been feeling the stress of an increasing pressure that has
been building for the better part of a decade. It is an external pressure of demands,
which forces us to explain wherein our value as scientific contributors lie. To give
an answer, we would need to define what values we provide on terms that are
scientific, but I also believe that part of the answer can only be given by examining
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how we contribute to the democratization of both society and science. Our legit-
imacy as a scientific discipline is decided not only internally in the scientific com-
munity, but also by the policy-makers, and not in the least: by the people.
The privilege we, as scientist, have is one wherein there is a set of duties built in.
Our privilege rests upon three pillars that are to (1) advance our understanding of
the world, technology, and human life, and (2) to generate economic surplus, a
necessity in many of today’s societies, and not in the least (3) to disseminate both
new (and older) works of knowledge to the public for the sake of general education
and enlightenment. Boiled down it is a simple yet complex task of increasing,
sustaining, and disseminating. Economy is something we need to factor in, because
it is the part that allows the clockwork to keep on ticking; it is our battery. A
battery is an integral part of the machinery, but not in itself the point of it. It is the
means, not the goal. However, in recent times it has become just that. Neoliberal
values are overtaking the core of democracy, which we see with the increase of
deregulation, privatization and all the effort put into maintaining a functioning
market (Harvey, 2007, pp. 1–4). In this I recognize the urgency for not leaving Innis
question, as quoted above, unanswered. In the next section, I shall examine how
the value that the collected psychologies provide translate into duties we have as
researchers in a normative field of science.
The value of cultural psychology
Psychology as a field has found itself in a crisis since its inception. Time and again
we are struck with criticism, and recent years have been no exception. Two big
reports stand out thus far. First is the publication of the now infamous study that
replicated one hundred psychological experiments and was only able to find sig-
nificant correlations in less than a third of them (Open Science Collaboration,
2015). Second, there is the revelation that leading figures of the American
Psychological Association had colluded with the CIA in torturous interrogations
in regards to the war on terror, according to the independent review informally
known as the Hoffman Report (Hoffman et al., 2015). These examples have only
added to the questions people have; what is the value of psychology and what good
does it do? As in some cases, it obviously does the opposite of good. I myself have
had to argue with those from other disciplines about psychology’s status as a
science and even as a discipline that is taught in universities. Clearly, an open
conversation with the scientific community and the public about psychology and
its values is needed, but it is also something we need to continually address intern-
ally, since these types of question do have merit and deserve answers.
Putting other branches of psychology to the side and focusing on cultural psych-
ology, we can begin to ponder whether what we do does provide value. Cultural
psychology finds itself on the verge between philosophy and psychology (while we
must not neglect that we are also deeply linked with sociology, technology studies,
and anthropology), and our particular ‘‘brand’’ of research provides interesting
insights into the human condition, which is also pointed out by Innis, and how we
406 Culture & Psychology 22(3)
all manage to live together (see Brinkmann, in this issue, for more about the
normativity of psychology as a moral science). We are concerned with the
human as a cultural being. What we exhibit is a curiosity towards how we experi-
ence the paradox that is both the simplicity and complexity of living. Some cultural
studies make their contribution by adding to the historical perspectives, thereby
helping to increase our total understanding and knowledge about the human soci-
etal and cultural development through the ages, while other areas focus on con-
temporary societies and conditions, which allows us to understand better what is
going on in our time. Often times an emphasis in cultural psychology is on estab-
lishing links between the historical and the contemporary. Through these efforts we
put into words, elements of human life and conduct that would not otherwise be
expressed or known. I would not call it a stretch to assign the same value to this
type of research as we do to astronomy. Yes, we probably do not have any hope for
a Grand Theory that will unite all of psychology, and it is probably not through us
we will achieve ascension into the post-physical realm, opposite astronomers who
tease us with their tantalizing promise of locating new planets ready to be colonized
as safe alternatives to our impending, self-inflicted doom on this world. Despite
knowing this, I suspect most cultural psychologists rest easy with our role
(although being an astro-psychologist would have a certain ring to it), and so
should the rest of the scientific community. We approach our field both systemat-
ically and conduct our research in order to bring into light the processes by which
society operates. Rather than show you a map of the night sky, we are the guides
who take you to the stars themselves (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 240f). What we happen
to have against us is that we engage with a part of the scientific spectrum where we
often need to revise what we presume to know for it to remain accurate, and even
then it will only be accurate to a certain extent. People change. Societies change.
Fast. In comparison, we expect atoms and quarks to remain somewhat stable over
time. Seeing ourselves as the microscopes of the human- and social sciences would
not be wrong. We are constantly zooming in on specific samples; therefore, we
constantly need to appropriate our knowledge, methods, and theories to abide by
specific conditions, since much of our presumed knowledge stems from highly
localized contexts and often times prove to be completely wrong in other settings
(Danziger, 1997). Luckily, however, we are a heterogeneous discipline, and there-
fore able to look into many different areas though different methodological lenses
(Valsiner, 2009, pp. 5f). Attaining a clearer and better understanding of human
living and culture should in itself be a worthy goal for a science to engage in. Our
power of prediction might be small, but that is only because we seek to understand
the close contexts of why something becomes what it is. There is no ultimate end in
sight. Our ontological field is always evolving, which means we too will have to
continually adapt our epistemological grasp.
Doing research is in itself a worthy pursuit. If this was not the case, no basic
research would receive funding, and Einstein or Bohr would not have the reputa-
tion still clinging to their names today. This might seem like a tautological state-
ment, which is because it is exactly that. We have an interest in attaining
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knowledge, because we lack it in the first place. This creates an interest, along with
intellectual resources being put into the endeavor of pursuing that interest.
Research thus becomes valuable through an utterly pragmatic process of valuation
as described by Dewey (1939, pp. 36–38). Not all scientific endeavors may seem to
have an immediate purpose, and only time will tell if we ever find one for every-
thing we pursue. Despite this, most discoveries often end up becoming means to
other ends in problem solving (another point made by Dewey, 1939, p. 43), which is
why most scientific efforts are part of our collective goal, which is to better under-
stand the world we inhabit. Holding on to this fact is important when facing the
current attacks on the humanities and social sciences, which only build upon the
criticisms already applied to psychology and its related fields. A key argument for
devaluing the humanities is that in an economic sense, a liberal arts major, a his-
torian, or an English major is worth less than a physicist, or an engineer. A ration-
ale that is deeply seethed in the history of science (Gould, 2011, pp. 11–20), which
has now found its way into market logics where, comparably, we, in the huma-
nities, are less likely to do research that can be patented (viz. research that can
easily be transformed into money). Wealth can be a byproduct of doing science and
engineering, but is not the be-all end-all of scientific endeavors. While the argument
is true in one form, people educated in the humanities do have a harder time finding
jobs (Carnevale & Cheah, 2013), but it is a poor measure of the value of learning to
exclusively look at it in terms of future earning potentials. Money is what we need
to sustain scientific practice; it is not the goal of scientists to ensure economic
growth for the sake of it. Money-making has become an end so standardized by
custom that we rarely pause to scrutinize whether any value is really produced by
pursuing it (Dewey, 1939, p. 43). This again brings us to the heart of my point:
ensuring that people are taught and practiced at critical thinking, communication,
cultural understanding, and history is the backbone of preserving a democratic
society. It is from philosophy, the humanities, arts, and the social sciences we
have witnessed the rise of empowering movements such as the early Marxism
and later feminism. Movements like these have played a vital role in the bettering
of the lives of millions of people all over the world (Christians, 2011, pp. 73–75).
So, to clarify my point: the theoretical considerations that are borne from the
intersectional crossing between cultural-psychology and philosophy do provide
value. It is of worth in the sense that it adds to the cumulative scientific under-
standings. The Danish word for science, videnskab, which translates into: know-
ledge creation, is something we surely are guilty of doing as cultural psychologists,
despite the fact that our results often are unstable and context dependent. We speak
from a position that allows us to make transparent the processes by which societies
operates – a strong tool that can act as a safeguard for democracy. Journalism is at
times referred to as the fourth estate, or the fourth pillar of democracy (Schultz,
1998). In the crossing we have between psychology and philosophy shouldn’t we, in
some capacity, fulfill the same role? Our approach is often more systematic, sup-
ported by sources, and documentation (be they qualitative or quantitative), while
also resting on the shoulders of those who came before us. Journalism deals with
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the here and now, whereas we are able to stay with a subject more thoroughly.
Linking science to values and political life is not a foreign theme to introduce.
Unfortunately, we mostly see the dark side of this link. As Steinar Kvale has
pointed out, psychology, and this is true for science in a general sense too, often
allows the market to decide its uses and direction, be it as a natural science, a
therapeutic form or a way to optimize an organization – money is a powerful
motivator (Kvale, 2003, pp. 595–597). However, our starting point was that cul-
tural psychology is, in fact, a normative science. Why should we be reluctant to
engage openly with politics and the market, when it is already the case that these
are influencing science-making? The realization that we have a normative dimen-
sion essentially means that we cannot claim to be neutral, we should face the
consequences of what it means to be part of an institution that affect peoples
lives in a very real sense and consider what kind of impact we want to have. We
need to consider our democratic duties to the people in order to repel, to the best of
our ability, the unhealthy processes that we are ruled by, and do this by shining a
light on them. Nikolas Rose has pointed out that psychology is more than abstract
theories, rather it is: ‘‘[. . .] an ‘intellectual technology’, a way of making visible and
intelligible certain features of persons, their conducts, and their relations with one
another’’ (Rose, 1996, pp. 10–11). Through the intellectual machinery, the world is
reified and rendered thinkable, which in turn put it into terms that are concrete and
therefore more likely to be subject to change.
Why is the notion of democracy important?
Democracy is one of the crowning values that we in the western, industrialized
world use to style ourselves with. As a value, it is instilled in us from the very start
of our lives, and it has since been used to rationalize going to war, and as a reason
to start and support revolutions against totalitarian regimes the harrowing conse-
quences of which we now see manifest themselves as problems on an international
scale. To fly the banner of democracy is very powerful – to the degree where it
almost becomes axiomatic to assume democratic values above anything else. Just
as I argue about economics and neoliberalism, so too does democratic values need
to be scrutinized. In order to do this, we need to distinguish between democracy as
it is practiced, and the ideals it is based on. Any form of oppression or discrimin-
ation goes against the democratic principles. What compels us towards democracy
are the promises of freedom and equality (Aristotle, 1999, p. 127). The flaw in this
argument is, of course, that at the time where democracy was first practiced,
women, slaves, and lesser men were not given voice. Yet, I would find it odd to
hold a lesser developed sense of the human rights against the idea of democracy to
this day, as they are easily separated from each other, where we today have a much
more inclusive category when it comes to whom we name citizen. The notion of
citizenship must not be forgotten either. An implication of democratic rule is that
with freedom comes responsibility, to both govern and let yourself be governed
(Aristotle, 1999, p. 70f). Democracy is not the road towards a society where one
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can do everything according to one’s own fancy, but quiet the contrary. Living in a
democracy is one of obligations and duties towards others – just like the duties
reflected in the practice of science. If we wish to progress towards a society that
allows for freedom, we need to fulfill the obligations and duties of the democratic
constitution, herein, says Aristotle, lies not slavery, but salvation (Aristotle, 1999,
p. 127).
The democratic values that we hold in such high regard are under attack.
Neoliberal values, the commodification and privatization as the means for eco-
nomic regulation (Rose & Millar, 1992, p. 198), have in the past decades gained
an increase of influence in our current system. In several areas we see matters of
public interest overtaken by corporations and policy-makers. Some examples are
big pharma’s role in psychiatry (Rose, 2007), corporate interests in energy and
climate (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2012), and the neoliberalization of the
educational system (Davies & Bansel, 2007; Rømer, 2015). We have seen recent
example of this in Denmark too, where we saw a new Freedom of Information Act
passed in 2014. This act hinders access for the public and journalists to documents
that are relevant for maintaining transparency in the political process (Cphpost.dk,
2013). It is an ironic turn of events, when those in power pass acts that decreases
transparency, while at the same time arguing for more surveillance of public spaces
and private citizens. These examples alone go against the principles of a democratic
rule. Democracy is essentially anarchistic in that it relies on the seventh title that
provides a mandate to rule or govern, as they are listed by Plato in his work, ‘‘the
Laws’’ (Rancı̀ere, 2013, pp. 77f). This is the title of divine (random) selection. Some
of the other titles listed are the right of the strong to rule the weak, the parents to
rule the child, the noble to rule the slaves, the elder to rule the younger. All of these
titles have a form of governing named after them e.g. technocracy, oligarchy or
aristocracy. Democratic rule distinguishes itself from these forms of governing,
since for it to truly work, and for its principles to be upheld, we would have to
rely on random selection rather than letting anyone govern, because of precon-
ceived notions of the entitlement to rule. Abiding by the seventh title is the only fair
way to ensure the absence of all the other titles when it comes to governing
(Rancı̀ere, 2013). Of course direct democracy would be the sure-fire way to
ensure the rule of the people as opposed to the model of representation which
has been adopted by many modern nations. The ineffectiveness of this form of
government in ensuring equality and freedom among people are what is at heart of
Jacques Rancı̀ere’s critique in his book The Hatred of Democracy (2013) about the
state of the modern democracy. Here he shows that the idea of representational
democracy goes directly against the principles of democracy, since a parliamentary
system, or regime as he names it, effectively allows an elite to be established – those
who, for various reasons, see themselves as more fit to govern. We end up with a
ruling segment of the population only depending on the people during elections,
where they obtain a legitimized mandate to govern; they will then proceed to
operate without much interference from those who gave them that mandate
(Rancı̀ere, 2013, pp. 99f). Democracy really is no more than a modern day illusion.
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Rather than allowing for more freedom we are instead witnessing the slow trickle
of corporations gaining influence in politics and science. So we find ourselves in a
paradoxical position, which can be summed up nicely like so: democratic values are
guiding our society despite the fact that the practical manifestation of these values
are absent. The interest of one party is essentially suppressing that of another, and
it happens to be that it is the few and the rich, who govern the many through clever
mechanisms that instill in people a self-governing gaze in accordance with market
ideologies (Rose & Miller, 1992, pp. 174f).
So where does this leave cultural psychology? The point advocated for in this
commentary is that political awareness should be a more integrated part of the
way cultural psychologists work. Highlighting the political interests that undeni-
ably are woven into our practice, and holding firmly onto what research is actu-
ally telling us even on topics that are politically charged. The notion of
democracy should be important to us for the simple reason that it is endangered.
It would not be wrong to state that one thing that is needed is to have science
inform politics, rather than having politics inform science, as has been the case in
the examples listed previously. There is a need for us to actively battle the mind-
set that haunts our postmodern world, where the sciences are basically relegated
to the place where Paul Feyerabend parked them in his anarchist approach,
saying that science provides no better basis for knowing about the world than
black magic or numerology does (Feyerabend, 1993, pp. 159–163). What is
needed is the opposite. As researchers we inhabit a privileged space that allows
us to see the world in a way only few have access to. While we could essentially
say the same about voodoo, our discipline differs from it by being stretched far
into the realms of both normativity and morality. So much so that science is not
only a matter of personal preference and attitudes, but encompasses matters of
public interest such as climate changes and mental health issues. We need to trust
in the institution of science. It is an essential tool for actually sustaining and
furthering a democratic way of life, while remaining transparent as to how we do
this. Despite philosophical uncertainties in regards to what we can say from an
epistemological and ontological perspective, where we tend towards a doubt-
metaphysics, with a highlight of the fragile and fragmented nature of our per-
ception of the world, which is often turned into a weakness that hinders any calls
for action on our part. Doubt is a fundamental principle of living, and a strength
as it forces us to make critical examinations, especially when we presume to see
something as clear cut. Though we cannot discern Archimedean truths while
holding true to the principles of cultural psychology, we shouldn’t take this as
a sign that passivity is the best path forward.
Conclusions
The end that we should try and achieve is thus double ended. The end-in-view is
one where psychology contributes to a more transparent society and serves to
uphold the democratic ideals of freedom, equality, and mutual responsibility.
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There is a lack of and want for this, which is evident when looking at how science
and decision-making is influenced by agents who work in the obscure to twist
fortune in their favor, and the limited knowledge we have about the way they
operate. Since we are not simply philosophers, but a hybrid of sorts between phil-
osophers and psychologists, we cannot allow ourselves to stay with abstractions
and theory. This is where this comment has echoed Dewey’s view as he presented it
on education. When we first began to acknowledge that our research has an impact
on how people view themselves and their place in the world, it also provided us
with compelling reasons for why we should also consider the political reality of the
world that surrounds us, and act according to the duties that follow from our
profession. We should take even greater care to enlighten, support and aide the
public in all matters where our knowledge, our moral and ethical understanding of
the world, become relevant.
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